Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
Faculty Publications
2008-12-09

The Gendered Meanings of Assets for Divorce
Jeffrey P. Dew
Brigham Young University - Provo, jeff_dew@byu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub
Part of the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Original Publication Citation
Dew, J. P. (2009). The gendered meanings of assets for divorce. Journal of Family and
Economic Issues, 30, 20–31.
BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Dew, Jeffrey P., "The Gendered Meanings of Assets for Divorce" (2008). Faculty Publications. 4511.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/4511

This Peer-Reviewed Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more
information, please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

J Fam Econ Iss (2009) 30:20–31
DOI 10.1007/s10834-008-9138-3

ORIGINAL PAPER

The Gendered Meanings of Assets for Divorce
Jeffrey Dew

Published online: 9 December 2008
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Abstract Scholars identified a negative relationship
between assets and divorce decades ago, but the mechanisms behind this relationship remain unknown. Using data
from the National Survey of Families and Households
(N = 4,721 couples), this study compared three mechanisms that might link assets and divorce. Non-proportional
Cox hazard models indicated that two of the three mechanisms explained the relationship between assets and
divorce. Wives’ marital satisfaction and their perceptions
of their hypothetical post-divorce standard of living completely mediated the relationship between assets and
divorce. The relationship between assets and divorce was
not related to husbands’ characteristics.
Keywords Assets  Commitment  Divorce  Gender 
Marital satisfaction

Because contemporary married couples cannot take marital
permanence for granted, they may take a financial risk by
jointly accumulating assets. Although wealth can decrease
the economic shock of divorce for dual-earner couples that
have relatively equal incomes (Finke and Pierce 2006),
divorce is devastating to couples’ net-worth when assets
are divided (Zagorsky 2003a). Despite these risks, contemporary married couples continue to accumulate assets
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and the majority of married couples hold their assets jointly
(Fletschner and Klawitter 2005).
Ironically, holding assets jointly may decrease couples’ risk of divorce; financial assets and divorce
negatively relate. Although researchers have known of
this association for over 50 years (Locke 1951), the
mechanisms that link assets and divorce have rarely been
tested. Consequently, it is unknown whether the relationship between assets and divorce occurs because
assets increase the attractiveness of the marriage, raise
the cost of divorce, or because stably and happily married couples have more incentives to accumulate assets
and have fewer incentives to separate. Further, research
has not explored gender differences in the relationship
between assets and divorce.
Studying the relationship between assets and divorce
may show how these two factors relate to wives’ wellbeing.
If, for example, assets keep women in unhappy marriages,
their physical and mental health may suffer (Hawkins and
Booth 2005). Further, although women experience less
intense economic consequences following divorce now
than in the past (McKeever and Wolfinger 2001), divorce
still has greater economic consequences for women than
for men (Daniels et al. 2006; McKeever and Wolfinger
2001; Morgan et al. 1992; Smock et al. 1999). Thus, the
possibly gendered mechanisms that explain the relationship
between assets and divorce may relate to women’s economic well-being following divorce. For example,
although assets may reduce the likelihood of divorce
because wives do not want to live at a lower standard of
living, when it does occur women with assets would have
more economic resources. The relationships between gender, marriage, and assets have been understudied even
though these factors are all potential sources of wellbeing
and inequality (Schmidt and Sevak 2006).
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This study compares three mechanisms derived from
social exchange theory in an attempt to explain the relationship between assets, divorce, and gender. The analyses
use data from two waves of the National Survey of
Families and Households, a nationally representative longitudinal study.

Previous Studies of Assets and Divorce
The relationship between assets and divorce has been
known for a long time. In the mid-twentieth century,
researchers found a positive cross-sectional association
between assets and marital satisfaction, and a negative
cross-sectional association between assets and divorce
(Levinger 1965; Locke 1951). Later, longitudinal data
demonstrated that assets negatively predicted divorce over
time (Booth et al. 1986; Galligan and Bahr 1978;
Schaninger and Buss 1986 though see Sanchez and Gager
2000 who found no relationship). Interestingly, assets
predicted divorce better than income (Galligan and Bahr
1978).
Recently, studies have moved away from analyzing the
preventive nature of assets on divorce and have focused
instead on married couples’ asset changes as they stayed
married or progressed toward divorce. For example, the
longer individuals remained married the more assets they
accumulated (Hao 1996). Married individuals also had
higher rates of asset accumulation than both single individuals and formerly married individuals (Zagorsky
2003a). Further, couples began spending down their wealth
prior to divorce (Zagorsky 2003a), unless they earned
about the same amount of money (Finke and Pierce 2006).
Because of this shift in focus, the mechanisms behind the
relationship between assets and divorce have still not been
fully explored.

The Different Meanings of Assets in Social Exchange
Theory
Social exchange theory offers explanations for relationship
development and dissolution. Utilizing familiar principles
of reward maximization and cost minimization, exchange
theory explains that spouses compare the rewards and costs
(called ‘‘outcomes’’) of their marriage with their relationship expectations (called the ‘‘comparison level’’) (Nye
1979; Thibault and Kelley 1959). If over many interactions, spouses feel that their marital outcomes (e.g., benefit/
cost ratios) exceed their comparison level, then they will be
satisfied with the relationship. Conversely, if the outcomes
fall below the comparison level, then spouses will be
dissatisfied with the relationship.
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In social exchange theory, marital dissolution is thought
to occur when spouses’ outcomes fall below the ‘‘comparison level for alternatives’’ or ‘‘CLAlt’’ (Thibault and
Kelley 1959). The CLAlt is the lowest level of outcomes a
spouse will accept without moving to dissolve the marriage. Below this point, a spouse feels that his or her
alternatives to the marriage (including living alone) will
yield better outcomes than the marriage offers. The
attractiveness of alternatives to marriage is inversely related to a spouse’s dependency on the marriage. That is, if
they want to leave but cannot because of few alternatives
they are more likely to remain in the marriage. Thus, for
example, an individual who does not depend on their
spouse for economic support might view divorce as a
viable alternative to the marriage; an individual who is
completely dependent on their spouse for economic support might not.
The factors that make up exchange theory (e.g., rewards,
costs, comparison level, and comparison level of alternatives) can change over time. For example, if spouses
frequently experience outcomes that exceed their comparison level or expectations, they stop making exchange
comparisons (Levinger 1976; Nye 1982). As spouses begin
to experience dissatisfaction with their relationship, however, exchange becomes more salient and they may tend to
disregard potential future rewards from the marriage
(Levinger 1976; Sabatelli 1999).
Changes in these factors may also be mutually reinforcing. Spouses who are more likely to think about and
monitor the costs of the marriage, and who expect quick
reciprocal behavior from their spouse when they behave
positively, are more likely to be dissatisfied with their
relationship (Buunk and Van Yperen 1991; Fincham and
Beach 1999). Further, men and women that are dissatisfied
with their marriages attend more to alternatives to the
marriage (e.g., the CLAlt) by viewing members of the
opposite sex more positively (Miller 1997).
Marital rewards, costs, comparison levels, and comparison level of alternatives work together and offer three
competing mechanisms that relate financial assets and
divorce. The first mechanism is selection, which asserts
that the negative relationship between assets and divorce is
spurious. A second possibility is that assets help spouses
enjoy their marriage more and thus make divorce less
likely. A final mechanism is that assets may keep individuals from divorcing by reducing the CLAlt (e.g., by
making divorced living seem less plausible).
Assets, Divorce, and Selection
The simplest explanation for assets predicting divorce is
selection. That is, couples who are less likely to divorce are
also more likely to accumulate assets. Social exchange
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theory supports a selection explanation because it predicts
that those who are the most likely to accumulate assets are
also those who are the least likely to divorce. Social
exchange theory asserts that individuals who have the most
to gain by maintaining their marriage will invest the most
in it, whereas those with the least to lose by its dissolution
will invest the least (Nye 1982; Sabatelli 1999). Applying
this to marital satisfaction suggests that individuals who are
happy in their marriage have more to gain by increasing
their marital investments (e.g., by increasing their jointlyheld assets). But because they are happy in their marriage
they are also less likely to divorce. Thus, spouses that are
satisfied with their marriage will be more likely to accumulate assets and also be less likely to divorce. Because
marital satisfaction may be associated with increased assets
levels and decreased divorce probabilities, this creates the
illusion that assets and divorce are somehow linked.
Perceived marital stability is another variable that may
spuriously link assets and marital stability. Individuals who
perceive that their marriage is stable can invest in their
marriage with less risk (Cherlin 2004; Pollak 1985). When
couples divorce, they lose ‘‘relationship specific’’ investments they have made (e.g., time and effort) because these
types of investments will not transfer to new relationships.
This loss also applies to jointly-held financial assets
because they are divided during the divorce settlement
(England and Farkas 1986). Consequently, individuals who
feel more confident about the stability of their marriage can
more aggressively accumulate assets than individuals who
are unsure about their marriages. Further, if their perceptions of marital stability are correct then they are less likely
to divorce.
Marital satisfaction and perceived marital stability may
be more selective for husbands than for wives. Most husbands outearn their wives, and most married couples pool
their income (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Winkler
et al. 2005). Thus, husbands convert more of their income
into joint assets than wives, and would have more of an
investment to lose in the event of a divorce. Consequently,
husbands may be more reluctant than wives to accumulate
jointly-held assets unless they are happy and perceive that
they have a stable union.
Hypothesis 1 Marital satisfaction and perceived marital
stability predict both asset accumulation and lower divorce
likelihoods. These selection issues explain the relationship
between assets and divorce more for husbands than for
wives.
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divorce may exist, the theory also suggests that assets may
fulfill marital expectations and thus lead to less divorce. In
a classic treatise on relationship dissolution, under a
heading titled ‘‘Marital Attractions,’’ Levinger (1976)
wrote,
… couple property, if it represents a truly joint
investment, may add to the stability of the relationship. To the extent that partners have consulted
mutually in acquiring the property, and that it symbolizes what they both treasure, joint property would
be a strength rather than a weakness of their relationship’’ (p.31).
Levinger’s (1976) idea can be restated in the language
of social exchange theory: married couples expect to
jointly accumulate assets and when they meet this expectation, they are less likely to divorce. Thus, accumulating
assets helps couple’s marital outcomes to exceed their CL.
Some studies suggest that married couples do expect to
accumulate assets. Social norms regarding marriage
include being financially stable prior to and during the
marriage (Edin 2001; Smock et al. 2005). Spouses expect
to buy a home, save for children’s college education, and
build a retirement fund (Townsend 2002; Waite and
Gallagher 2000). Expectations of financial wellbeing may
also compliment marital expectations of permanence and
commitment (Cherlin 2004; Pollak 1985) and help couples
accumulate more assets. If accumulating assets helps
couples to meet their marital expectations, then marital
satisfaction should mediate the relationship between assets
and divorce. That is, assets should positively predict marital satisfaction, which would then relate to a lower
likelihood of divorce.
Like selection, this satisfaction hypothesis may be more
appropriate for husbands than for wives. Husbands may
view asset accumulation, especially home ownership, as a
means of enacting their provider role. Although marriage
has become more egalitarian now than in the past, both
women and men expect husbands to economically provide
for their families (Smock et al. 2005). In addition to providing a stable income, men want to provide their families
with a home, education, etc. (Townsend 2002). In support
of the idea that husbands feel validated in their roles by
accumulating assets, research has shown that husbands
report their net-worth to be 30% higher than their wives
report (Zagorsky 2003b). That is, when asked, husbands
may inflate their net-worth to show that they are behaving
appropriately as breadwinners.

Assets Fulfilling Marital Expectations

Hypothesis 2a Marital satisfaction mediates the relationship between assets and divorce for husbands.

Although scholars can use social exchange theory to
explain why a spurious relationship between assets and

Levinger’s (1976) assertions about couples’ assets bring
up issues of fairness. Levinger stated that both spouses
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must value the assets they accumulate if assets are to serve
as an attraction to the marriage. Assets would not help a
couple’s marital satisfaction if one spouse unilaterally uses
discretionary income to accumulate more assets while the
other spouse would rather use discretionary income to
increase consumption. In such a situation, either spouse
may feel unfairly dealt with, and the assets may remind
them of the unfairness in the marriage. Fairness in money
making decisions is related to marital satisfaction and
stability (Schaninger and Buss 1986). Thus, the ability for
assets to act as an attraction to the marriage depends on
whether spouses feel they have an equitable say in how
money is used in the marriage.
Hypothesis 2b Perceptions of financial unfairness will
moderate the relationship between marital satisfaction and
divorce.
Assets as Barriers to Divorce
Rather than enhancing the attractiveness of the marriage by
helping marital outcomes to exceed couples’ CL, assets
may relate to less divorce by decreasing the attractiveness
of divorce (e.g., lowering the CLAlt). Asset accumulation
decreases the attractiveness of divorce because couples
must divide their assets when they separate (Johnson 1991;
Zagorsky 2003a). In addition to having a lower net-worth,
the process of liquidating and dividing assets may force
individuals to live at a lower standard of living following a
divorce. Individuals would know that they will have to live
in a smaller home, for example, if the home they jointly
own will be sold during a divorce. Maritally dissatisfied
individuals may consider both these factors as they think
about the alternatives to their marriage.
Although the difference is subtle, these two mechanisms
(assets meeting expectations versus assets lowering the
attractiveness of divorce) are different and have different
consequences. Marital attractions enhance marital quality,
while barriers to divorce simply make it more difficult to
divorce regardless of the marital quality (Johnson 1991;
Johnson et al. 1999). As an attraction to the marriage, assets
would help spouses feel satisfied in their marriage. As barriers
to divorce, assets would keep individuals from divorcing but
do nothing to enhance their feelings toward their marriage.
Structural commitment is a term indicating how much
an individual spouse feels compelled to remain in the
marriage because of the barriers to divorce (Johnson 1991).
These barriers may include difficulty in accessing divorce
procedures or having few viable alternatives to the marriage. Consequently, assets may be a form of structural
commitment because they may prevent divorce by
decreasing the likelihood that spouses’ would want to live
at a lower post-divorce standard of living.
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Interestingly, spouses do not attend to structural commitment unless they are unhappy in their marriages. Both
qualitative and quantitative research has shown that barriers to divorce are much more salient for unhappy spouses
(Johnson 1991; Johnson et al. 1999; Previti and Amato
2003). Happily married spouses simply have no reason to
consider whether various aspects of their lives prevent
them from divorcing. Thus, a marital satisfaction by
structural commitment interaction term is included in the
models testing this mechanism.
Assets are more likely to be associated with wives’
feelings of structural commitment than of husbands’ feelings. Wives still have less economic power in marriage
than husbands, and even when wives earn more than their
husbands, they often have less power in the marriage
(Biddlecom and Kramarow 1998; Tichenor 1999; Winkler
et al. 2005). Additionally, the economic consequences of
divorce are harsher for women than for men (Bianchi et al.
1999). Divorced women often have to increase their work
participation prior to or following divorce (Gerner et al.
1990; Trzcinski 1996), and divorced fathers often fail to
pay child support or pay their full amount (Coleman and
Ganong 1992). Given wives’ economic disadvantages in
marriage and divorce relative to their husbands, wives may
be more reticent to divorce if it means losing assets.
Hypothesis 3 Structural commitment mediates the relationship between assets and divorce for wives, but only for
dissatisfied wives.

Method
Data and Sample
This study used data from the National Survey of Families
and Households (NSFH). The NSFH is a nationally representative longitudinal data set on family life that included
information on participants’ marital and financial situations. Participants and their spouses were interviewed in
1987–1988 and 1992–1994. The sample used in this study
included individuals who were married at the first wave,
and whose spouse participated in both Wave 1 (W1) and
Wave 2 (W2). Further, if the participants divorced their
divorce date had to be between W1 and W2 (some couples
had illogical divorce dates). 4,721 married couples met the
selection criteria.
An additional 898 couples met all of the selection criteria, but did not participate in W2 of the NSFH. The
couples who left the sample were older, had longer marital
durations, were slightly less educated, and had lower asset
and income levels. In all marital respects, however, they
were equal to the individuals that stayed in the study (e.g.,
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they had similar marital satisfaction, similar ratings of
perceived marital stability, etc.). Since the couples that did
not participate in W2 had marriages that were comparable
to the other participants’ they may have had similar divorce
rates. If they had participated in W2 and been included in
this study, couples that left the NSFH may have lowered
the relationship between assets and the likelihood of
divorce (since they had lower assets). Thus, the results
from this study must be interpreted in light of the attrition.
Despite the attrition problem, I used the NSFH for this
study because the data had unique characteristics that helped
address the hypotheses. First, the NSFH was one of the few
studies to combine detailed questions about couples’ assets
with questions about their marriage. Second, the NSFH
surveyed both spouses in most households. This feature
enabled gendered analyses to be run without any appreciable
loss of statistical power. Further, when husbands and wives
were analyzed separately, the relative weight of husbands’
characteristics and wives’ characteristics in the relationship
between assets and divorce could be compared.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for participants.
Participants were generally satisfied in their marriages (the
mean was six with a maximum of seven), perceived that
their marriages would last (a mean of 4.5 with a maximum
score of five) and most felt that the way money was handled
in the marriage was fair to themselves. The average age of
the participants was between 40 and 44 years-old, most
participants were European-American, and were in their first

marriage. Despite reports of high marital satisfaction and
stability in W1, 11% of the couples ended their marriage
between W1 and W2 (see Table 1). The mean length of time
to divorce was 40.86 months or about 3.5 years.
Measures
Because the analyses were Cox hazards models, divorce
was operationalized as the number of months until couples
experienced a divorce or were right censored (e.g., ended
the study without experiencing divorce). Couples’ months
in the study started at W1 when all of the covariates were
first measured. Months of survival in the study were calculated by subtracting the month of the divorce from the
month of the W1 interview. If couples were right censored,
months of survival were calculated by subtracting the
month of the W2 interview of the couples from the month
of the W1 interview.
Couples’ assets were measured by summing couples’
savings (e.g., money market and savings accounts), financial investments (e.g., stocks and bonds), and net-worth of
their home. Unfortunately, the NSFH measured assets
jointly even if they were not truly held jointly. The distribution of the assets variable was highly skewed. To
reduce the skew, the assets variable was transformed using
a logarithmic (base 10) transformation.
Marital satisfaction was assessed using an item that
asked couples how satisfied they were with their marriage

Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Individual variables

Wives
M

Husbands
SD

Range

M

SD

Range

W1 Marital satisfaction

6.05

1.25

1–7

6.12

1.19

1–7

W1 Perceived stability

4.61

.72

1–5

4.62

.71

1–5

.12

.38

0–2

.09

.33

0–2

1–5

1–5

W1 Financial unfairness
W1 Structural commitment

3.84

.85

40.54
12.73

14.40
2.64

Blacka

.10

.30

Other racea

.07

.25

1.25

.52

W1 Age
W1 Education

Marital number

3.56

.89

43.16
12.82

14.88
3.14

0–1

.10

.30

0–1

0–1

.07

.25

0–1

1–6

1.27

.55

1–5

16–97
0–20

Couple variables

M

SD

Range

Divorce

.11

.31

0–1

Months until divorce

40.86

20.92

0–80

b

W1 Assets
W1 Family income

$30,000
$31,200b

$116,835
$43,551

$0–4,265,001
$0–982,000

W1 Marital duration

16.09

14.30

0–63

a

Omitted category = White, Non-Hispanic

b

Sample median
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19–89
0–20
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overall. Participants could respond that they were one (very
dissatisfied) to seven (very satisfied).
Perceived marital stability was measured by an item that
asked individuals to rate the chances that their marriage
would dissolve. The response set ranged from one (very
low) to five (very high). The responses were reverse coded
so that higher scores represented higher perceived marital
stability.
Perceived financial unfairness in money asked how fairly
participants felt spending money was handled in the relationship. The responses ranged from one (Very Unfair to Me)
to five (Very Unfair to Spouse) with three indicating no
unfairness. Since perceived unfairness to oneself was the
important factor in determining whether assets were an
attraction to the marriage (Levinger 1976), the scores were
first reverse coded so that higher scores represented more
unfairness to self. Then three was subtracted from each score,
and each score below zero was set to zero because scores
below zero did not indicate any unfairness to the participant.
Structural commitment was operationalized using an
item that asked participants how their standard of living
would be affected by divorce. Individuals could respond
from one (Standard of Living Would be Much Worse) to
five (Standard of Living Would be Much Better). This item
was reverse coded so that the higher an individual scored,
the more negatively divorce would affect their standard
of living and the more they experienced structural
commitment.
The models also control for W1 measures of age, marital
duration, income, education, and the number of children.
Although the independent variables could be constructed as
time varying, they could not be used as such because only
two waves were used. Were time varying covariates
included, they would have been confounded with changes
(e.g., divorce) that occurred between W1 and W2. Thus,
none of the variables in the analyses were time varying
covariates.
Some of the measures had missing responses. In order to
use data from participants with missing responses, multiple
imputation techniques were used.
Analyses
To analyze the selection hypothesis, W1 assets were
regressed on W1 marital satisfaction, W1 perceived marital
stability and the control covariates. This tested whether
satisfaction and perceived stability predicted high assets as
stated in the selection hypothesis.
The other two mechanisms (assets raising satisfaction, or
assets as barriers to divorce) were tested using a three step
process to test mediation effects (Baron and Kenny 1986).
First, the main independent variable––assets, had to predict
the purported mediator variables––marital satisfaction, and
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structural commitment. This was accomplished by regressing the marital satisfaction and structural commitment onto
assets and the control variables.
After showing that the independent variable predicted
the mediator variables, the second step of establishing a
mediation model was to run an analysis of the independent
variable and dependent variable without the mediators. The
third step was to run an analysis with the mediator variables. If the main independent variable was significant
before the addition of the mediator variables, but less
significant afterward, the mediation model was accepted.
Consequently, the second and third steps of evaluating the
satisfaction and barrier hypotheses used Cox hazards
regressions to test the relationship between assets and
divorce. That is, the Cox hazard regressions first showed
whether the independent variable (assets) predicted the
hazard of divorce in each month. Then the models were run
with the mediator variables of marital satisfaction and
structural commitment.
Using non-proportional hazard models was advantageous over other types of common analyses used in divorce
research (e.g., logistic regression) for a number of reasons.
First, they explicitly treated time as a variable rather than
simply assessing whether an event occurred. Thus, they
could show how assets related to the timing of the divorce
in addition to predicting whether or not it occurred. Second, they statistically corrected for the fact that some of the
right censored cases may in fact experience divorce in the
future (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). Third, hazard
regression models make no assumption about the underlying shape of the distribution of divorce that occurred
(Allison 1995; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). This is a
useful property for this particular analysis because no
models of the hazard of divorce exist. I was hesitant to run
a parametric model given how much results can change
depending on the model used (Blossfeld and Rohwer
2002). Thus, the hazard models allowed me to use an event
history analysis framework without being tied to a particular shape of the likelihood of divorce.
Initially, the analyses were intended to be proportional
Cox hazards models. However, interacting the main
independent variables with time showed that the hazard
curves were not proportional (see interactions in Tables 4,
5). Proportional hazards models assume that the hazard
(or likelihood) of divorce for two different groups (e.g.,
those with assets and those without assets) is the same
ratio no matter how many months of marriage have
elapsed. For example, the proportional models assume
that the ratio of the likelihood of divorce for those with
assets and those without assets is the same in the first
month of the study as the twentieth month of the study.
This assumption was not met. To correct this problem,
non-proportional hazards models were used. That is, all
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Results

Table 2 OLS Predictions of couples’ assets

Intercept
Marital satisfaction

Husbands

Wives

-4.32***

-4.62***

-.001

.02

Perceived marital stability

.06

.05

Family incomea

.22***

.22***

Marital duration

.01***

.01*

Age

.03***

.03***

Marital number

-.13**

Education

.12*

.15***

.18***

Blackb

-.63***

-.76***

Other raceb

-.62***

-.62***

R2

.25

Log 10 Transform

b

.26

Omitted category = White, Non-Hispanic

* p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001

the models contained an interaction terms where the main
independent variables were interacted with the log transformation of months in the study. Introducing these
interactions is an effective way to correct models when
the proportional hazards assumption is not met (Allison
1995; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002).
All of the analyses were run separately by gender.
Because the NSFH surveyed both husbands and wives in a
couple, the data were clustered. Using pooled clustered
data often results in biased estimates (Raudenbush and
Bryk 2002). These biased estimates would have resulted
even if the participants were pooled and an asset by gender
interaction term was included. Thus, running the analyses
separately had the advantage of producing estimates free of
the bias that would have resulted from the clustering. It
also had the advantage of assessing husbands’ and wives’
different contributions to the relationship between assets
and divorce.

Table 3 OLS Evaluations of
the mediation variables

W1 Assetsa
Family incomea
Marital duration

Log 10 Transform

Omitted category = White,
Non-Hispanic
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01;
*** p \ .001
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The first step of the mediation models showed that the
mechanisms that relate assets and divorce probably worked
through wives, but not husbands. W1 assets were unrelated
to husband’s marital satisfaction and feelings of structural
commitment (See Table 3). However, assets positively
predicted both wives’ marital satisfaction and feelings
of structural commitment (b = .03, p \ .05; b = .05,
p \ 001, respectively).
As expected, the hazard regression models were different for wives and husbands. Thus, the results will be
discussed separately by gender. In the model with just
assets and the control variables, assets negatively predicted
divorce (Table 4, Attraction Model 1). That is, for every 10
fold increase in assets, the hazard ratio of divorce
decreased by 7%. Interestingly, however, the asset by time
interaction was significant. To understand this interaction,
all significant variables were held at their means, and
various months and asset levels were entered into the
regression to obtain predicted hazards. As shown in Fig. 1,
assets’ negative relationship with divorce attenuated over
time (see Fig. 1). Thus for example, in the 6th month following W1 of the NSFH, couples with no assets were

Husbands’ marital
satisfaction
Intercept

b

The results did not support the selection hypothesis. Neither husbands’ nor wives’ marital satisfaction nor their
perceived marital stability at W1 was related to W1 assets
(see Table 2). Although many of the control variables
predicted assets (explaining 25% of the variance), marital
satisfaction and perceived marital stability were not statistically significant. If selection on these two variables
explained the relationship between assets and divorce, they
would have significantly predicted assets.
Assets as Attractions to Marriage/Barriers to Divorce

a

a

Selection

-.01
.01
-.02
.002

Age

.003

Marital number

.04

Husbands’ structural
commitment

Wives’ marital
satisfaction

Wives’ structural
commitment

.04

.32*

.12

-.009

.03*

.05***

-.04**
-.006*

.01
.008***

.01
.006**
.004*
-.06

.006*

-.002

-.12**

.008

Education

-.007

-.02***

-.01

-.01**

Blackb

-.11

-.21***

-.27***

-.42***

Other raceb

.15*

.005

.10

-.14**

R2

.01

.04

.01

.05
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Table 4 Wives’ non-proportional hazards ratios of the relationship between assets and divorce

W1 Assetsa

Assets as attractions to the marriage

Assets as barriers to divorce

Model 1

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

.92*

.93*

.97

.99

Model 2

.93*

W1 Financial unfairness

.98
1.09

W1 Marital satisfaction

1.16

.76***

.75***

Asset by unfairness interaction

.98

Asset by satisfaction interaction

.98

.76***

Structural commitment

.80***

Commitment by satisfaction interaction
Family incomea

1.03

.82***

.98

1.01

1.03

1.02

.97
.99
.98

Marital duration

.99

.99

.99

.99

.99

Age

.93***

.93***

.94***

.93***

.93***

.94***

1.84***

1.80***

1.68***

1.84***

1.85***

1.63***

Marital number
Education

.97

.97

.97

.97

.97

.97

1.42*

1.32

1.31

1.42*

1.22

1.31

.95

1.03

1.04

.95

1.05

1.65***

2.25***

Unfairness * time interaction

2.89*

1.63*

Marital satisfaction * time interaction

1.82**

2.13***

Blackb
Other raceb
Asset * time interaction

1.84***

Asset * unfairness * time interaction

.95
1.84***

1.40***

2.94***

1.22**

Structural commitment * time interaction

2.12***

Satisfaction * structural Commitment * time
Model fit

7672.55

7556.50

325.05***c

Fit improvement
a

Log 10 Transform
Omitted category = White, Non-Hispanic

c

Change in -2 Log Log Relative to Model 1

d

Change in -2 Log Log Relative to Model 2

2.01***
1.48***

7997.60

b

1.34***

116.05***d

7997.60

7915.64
81.96***c

7588.48
327.16***d

Predicted Hazard of Divorce at the Exact Month

* p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001
0.1
0.09
0.08
0.07

Couples with no assets at W1
Couples with $10,000 in assets
at W1
Couples with $100,000 in assets
at W1

0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0

6th Month

12th Month

36th Month

Exact Month

Fig. 1 The Relationship between assets and the predicted hazard of
divorce at the specified month of the NSFH

predicted to be 73 times more likely to divorce than individuals with $10,000 in assets. However, by the 36th
month following W1 of the NSFH, couples with no assets
were only 3.3 times more likely to divorce than couples
with $10,000 in assets.
Turning to tests of the mediating variables, adding
marital satisfaction and unfairness in money matters
improved the model fit (Table 4, Attraction Model 2).
Further, marital satisfaction negatively predicted the likelihood of divorce and adding it reduced the assets
coefficient to nonsignificance. None of the hypothesized
interaction variables were significant, however (Table 4,
Attraction Model 3). Consequently, assets seemed to
function as attractions to the marriage for wives, contrary
to hypothesis 2a, and the moderation role of financial
unfairness was unsupported.
Assets functioning as barriers to divorce also received
support. Again, by themselves, assets negatively predicted
the likelihood of divorce (Table 3, Barrier Model 1). When
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structural commitment was added to the model, the magnitude of the asset coefficient was reduced and assets were
no longer a significant predictor of divorce (Table 3, Barrier Model 2). Contrary to the idea that structural
commitment only influences dissatisfied wives, however,
the structural commitment by satisfaction interaction term
was not significant. Thus, both satisfied and dissatisfied
wives seemed to be aware that divorce might have negative
consequences for their standard of living.
Like the OLS regressions, the husbands’ non-proportional hazards models showed that the mechanisms that
relate assets and divorce worked completely through wives.
Although assets did negatively predict the likelihood of
divorce for husbands, the magnitude and significance of
this relationship always hovered around .92 with a statistical significance of p \ .01 regardless of the variables
added to the model (see Table 5). Consequently, husbands’
characteristics did not relate assets and divorce.

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to compare three mechanisms derived from social exchange theory that might
explain the negative relationship between assets and
divorce. Further, this study was designed to see whether
these mechanisms differed by gender. Non-proportional
Cox hazards models using data from the NSFH indicated
that assets were related to a lower hazard of divorce,
although over time this relationship attenuated. Wives’
marital satisfaction and feelings of structural commitment
completely mediated this association. This suggests that
assets may enhance wives’ marital satisfaction so they
do not want to divorce and/or raise their feelings of
structural commitment to make them feel like divorce is
not an option. Neither selection nor husband’s characteristics played a role in the relationship between assets and
divorce.

Table 5 Husbands’ non-proportional hazards ratios of the relationship between assets and divorce

W1 Assetsa

Assets as attractions to the marriage

Assets as barriers to divorce

Model 1

Model 1

.92**

W1 Financial unfairness

Model 2
.93*
1.23

W1 Marital satisfaction

.79***

Model 3
.91**

.92**

Model 2

Model 3

.93*

.93*

1.33*
.79***

Asset by unfairness interaction

1.04

Asset by satisfaction interaction

.96

.79***

Structural commitment

.90

Commitment by satisfaction interaction
Family incomea
Marital duration
Age
Marital number
Education
Blackb
Other raceb
Asset * time interaction
Unfairness * time interaction

1.03
.96***

1.02
.96***

1.02
.96***

1.03
.96***

1.02
.96***

.96***

.96***

.96***

.96***

.96***

1.44***

1.38***

1.40***

1.39***

1.39***

.95**

.96*

.94***

.95**

.95**

1.06

1.12

1.30

1.11

1.06

.84

.88

.85

.84

.83

.88

1.82***

1.67***
.55**

1.43***
.33***

1.77***

1.68***

1.82***

1.67***

Log 10 Transform
Omitted category = White, Non-Hispanic

c

Change in -2 Log Log Relative to Model 1

d

Change in -2 Log Log Relative to Model 2
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01; *** p \ .001
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1.58***
1.67**

.73***
1.77***

Satisfaction * structural commitment * time

a

.96*

1.30

Structural commitment * time interaction

b

.97***

.96***

Asset * unfairness * time interaction

Fit improvement

1.03

1.40***

Marital satisfaction * time interaction

Model fit

.96
1.01

1.82***
1.14

8033.09

7745.80
286.68***c

7717.66
28.11***d

8033.09

7987.44
45.24***c

7764.83
229.66***d
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Two reasons may explain why W1 levels of assets
became less negatively predictive of divorce the longer
wives remained in the study. First, the couples who went
on to divorce may have decreased their asset levels
between W1 and W2 and the further away from W1 couples got, the more likely they had decreased their assets.
Studies have shown that couples spend down assets prior to
divorce (Finke and Pierce 2006; Zagorsky 2003a). Alternatively, the interaction coefficients for marital satisfaction
and time and structural commitment and time are similar to
the asset by time interaction. That is, as time went on, W1
marital satisfaction and structural commitment became
progressively less associated with the hazard of divorce.
Thus, as time went on, wives may have reevaluated their
marital satisfaction and/or structural commitment. If wives
felt less satisfied or less structurally committed, then assets
would be less able to negatively relate to divorce. These
hypotheses about time could be tested using time varying
covariates.
Finding that both structural commitment and marital
satisfaction mediated the relationship between assets and
divorce for women was interesting and unexpected.
Unexpectedly, wives’ marital satisfaction (not husbands’)
was a mediator. This finding suggests that wives expected
their marriage to provide them with economic benefits
because assets predicted marital satisfaction. Within the
social exchange framework this finding indicates that
when marriage delivers the economic benefits that wives
expect, they are more satisfied with their marriage and less
likely to divorce. Other studies do show that marriage
expands women’s access to higher levels of economic
wellbeing such as income and assets (Hirschl et al. 2003;
Light and Ureta 2004; Schmidt and Sevak 2006) and
women may anticipate or expect this. As expected, however, wives are also reluctant to leave the marriage and
their financial assets if they will have a lower standard or
living following a divorce. The fact that structural commitment did not interact with marital satisfaction indicates
that, on some level, all wives are aware of the barriers to
divorce.
These two findings reveal inherent contradictions in the
way money and marriage relate. Although assets are generally associated with expanded life opportunities and
choices (Caputo 2003; Muntaner et al. 1998), this study
shows that assets actually restrict the choice sets of women
vis-à-vis divorce. Although the large majority of the
women in this study were happy in their marriages, women
with joint assets who were in unhappy marriages may have
had to choose between living at a higher standard of living
and leaving an unsatisfactory relationship. If unhappily
married women chose to remain in the marriage, their
physical and psychological health may have suffered
(Hawkins and Booth 2005). If a woman decided to leave
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the marriage, then she would lose assets and live at a lower
standard of living. Interestingly, however, these findings
also suggest that wives expect a marriage to provide economic benefits. The result of having economic assets was
not resentment for being in an economic interdependent
relationship, but rather being happy with the marriage
because having assets may have been meeting wives’
expectations.
This study has limitations that future research needs to
address before firmly concluding that assets are associated
with wives’ marital satisfaction and barriers to divorce. A
much better test of the mechanisms would be to analyze
whether changes in assets, marital satisfaction, and feelings
of structural commitment are associated with the hazard of
divorce. However, only having two panels and having the
panels being five years apart eliminated the ability to test
time varying covariates in the Cox models.
A second limitation is that another important mechanism––assets decreasing economic pressure––could not be
tested with the data. Economic pressure sharply increases
marital tensions and decreases positive marital interactions
(Conger et al. 1994; Liker and Elder 1983). However,
couples that accumulate assets report feeling less economic
pressure than couples without assets, possibly because they
can utilize their assets in case of economic difficulties
(Conger et al. 1993; Dew 2007; Muntaner et al. 1998).
Thus, couples might feel less economic pressure as they
build assets, which might help them avoid divorce (Gudmunson et al. 2007). Unfortunately, because questions on
couples’ feelings of economic pressure were not in the first
wave of the NSFH, this mechanism could not be tested
against the other mechanisms.
This study contributes to knowledge of how assets and
divorce relate. One contribution is simultaneously comparing the different mechanisms that link assets and
divorce. Scholars have had many different suppositions for
the relationship between assets and marital stability. These
hypotheses were rarely tested, though, and even when they
were tested, they were tested in isolation. This study was
able to compare three hypotheses using the same data and
show which hypotheses fit the data best. This approach is
useful in sorting through the scholarly opinions that exist
regarding how money and marriage are related.
Another contribution is finding that the relationship
between assets and divorce works completely through
wives and not husbands. This shows one way that gender is
a factor in the relationship between finances and marriage,
and indicates that researchers studying family finances
need to thoughtfully consider how gender might play a role
in family resource management. It also continues a long
line of research (e.g., Tichenor 1999; Zelizer 1994) that
shows that economic power imbalances in marriage offer
harsher alternatives to women than to men.
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Finally, this study shows that the gendered meanings of
money are by no means unidirectional (e.g., toward wives’
detriment). Although wives worried about the economic
consequences of divorce more than men, assets also benefited wives more than men. For example, husbands gained
no relational benefit from accumulating assets but wives
did. Consequently, jointly-held assets in marriage have
both positive and negative meanings for wives.
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